(Picture: 1967 Six Day War, Rafah Gaza. Israeli approaching Khan Yunis, a Palestinian city in the Gaza Strip)
The Hamas terror attack on Israel on 7th October has vitalised discussion not only of what is terrorism but also of how to defeat terrorism. The Asian Crime Century briefing 41 explained why Hamas is a terrorist group, but is also a local government (in Gaza), a Palestinian self-help organization, an Islamic religious group, and a political party. Terrorist and freedom fighter are not binary opposed meanings, and Hamas illustrates how an organisation and its members can be both.
As terrorism is complicated to define, so also is combatting and defeating terrorism. After the 9/11 terror attacks on the US by Al Qaeda, ‘counter-terrorism’ was a preoccupation of many government policy makers. Much was learnt by governments regarding how to combat terrorism, evidenced by the successful long-term actions against the Al Qaeda movement (which had numerous affiliated groups) and later Daesh (Islamic State). Neither has been entirely destroyed, and there are remnants of both groups operating at a much-diminished level in various parts of the world, but the counter terrorist efforts led by the US and its allies have ensured that the operational capability of these terrorist groups has been significantly reduced and their capability to recruit support has been hindered.
The question of how to defeat groups that engage in terrorism is again a matter of debate as Israel has vowed to destroy Hamas. The lesson from the “War on Terror” led by the US is that major terrorist groups will not be destroyed, but can be diminished to such an extent that they no longer pose a major threat to society. In that sense, governments are endlessly working to defeat terrorism through a variety of means, both military and civil. ‘Counter-terrorism’ can involve a variety of actions, including legislation, specialist police or military units, repression, military action, detention, media management, and negotiated settlements.
Fighting Terrorists – The Military Way
Democracies often need to employ military methods to seek and kill those engaged in terrorism. The military approach to counter-terrorism is illustrated by the US Army Field Manual, which states that “Counterterrorism consists in operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counterterrorism actions include strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the United States and its territories.” This indicates an offensive basis to counter-terrorism that is based on kinetic military operations.
The US intelligence-based approach to counter terrorism is also militaristic. The Counter Terrorism Centre of the CIA stated that the “war on terror is coordinated and run from the CTC which has both operational and analytic components; the fusion of these two is the key to its success .... The CTC, working with other US Government agencies and with foreign liaison partners, target terrorist leaders and cells, disrupt their plots, sever their financial and logistical links, and roil their safe havens.” The US intelligence-based approach is continuous and involves constant disruption to prevent terrorist acts.
However, the key lesson from the US “War on Terror” and the consequent prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq was that an overly militaristic approach to countering terrorism is not likely to succeed. Missing from the US ‘endless wars’ was a clear objective, leading to military actions that were prolonged because no objective meant no definition of success. Military responses to terrorism can meander and seem perpetual if there is no clear political objective set and agreed by government.
For instance, US military operations in Afghanistan from 2001 were ‘self-defense’ in response to Al Qaeda attacks on the USA from their base in Afghanistan but the mission meandered to include other objectives relating to building civil society until a messy exit in 2021. US military operations in Iraq from 2003 were in response to allegations of Iraqi government involvement in supporting Al Qaeda as well as erroneous accusations of development of weapons of mass destruction, but the failure to set clear long-term objectives left the US military caught in the middle of a Sunni-Shia civil war and the target of both until the withdrawal of US troops in 2011. Similarly, British military operations in Northern Ireland from 1969 were initially to support the overwhelmed police in restoring order between the Catholic and Protestant communities, but meandered into prolonged counter-terrorist operations lasting until 2007.
In contrast, the Indian government did not conduct a major military response after major terrorist attacks. In July 2006, over 180 people were killed when seven bombs detonated on trains around Mumbai. Indian security officials suspected that Lashkar-e-Toiba, a Kashmiri militant group operating from Pakistan, was responsible. In 2008, 174 people were killed when gunmen opened fire at multiple locations in Mumbai. Despite the suspicion of the involvement of Lashkar-e-Toiba and a Pakistani national convicted in court of offences relating to his participation in the 2008 attacks, the Indian government exercised restraint and did not take military action. The reasons are most likely more related to avoidance of war with Pakistan, which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. There was a clear decision by the Indian government that resorting to military action was not a preferred option and would probably worsen the situation.
Finding Terrorists – The Intelligence Way
The most effective weapon in combatting terrorism is intelligence. At a tactical level, operations by the police or military should be intelligence led so that the impact is maximized. At the strategic level, governments should base policies for countering terrorism on sound intelligence that leads to a real understanding of the nature of the threat as well as who is involved.
The British experience in counter-terrorism illustrates the value of an intelligence led approach. The government decided in 1992 to give the lead role in intelligence operations against Irish terrorist groups on mainland Britain to the Security Service (Mi5) instead of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, and intelligence operations were a major factor in the restricting Irish republican terrorist activities which in turn led to a stalemate and the eventual peace process.
An intelligence led approach accompanied by heavy-handed counter-terrorism operations may have as negative an impact as an excessive military response. An example of the successful use of good intelligence that resulted in tactical success against terrorism but eventual strategic defeat was the operation by the French military in Algiers from 1958. In response to the terrorist bomb and shooting attacks by the Front de Liberation National (FLN), the Governor-General of Algeria deployed the 10th Paratroop Division led by General Jacques Massu. The professional French military units were effective in the acquisition and use of good intelligence and executed a highly efficient tactical intelligence led campaign against the FLN in Algiers.
The French military took from the police all of their files regarding the FLN, divided Algiers into sectors under military command, and rounded up and arrested suspects who were detained without court warrants or hearings. In order to obtain good intelligence about the FLN the French engaged in institutionalized torture of suspects, including great use of water and electricity methods to torture suspects (reminiscent of the US mistakes using torture in Iraq and Afghanistan). The widespread use of arrests, detention, and torture to obtain intelligence effectively stopped the FLN in Algiers from conducting terrorist attacks in the short term and the organisation was severely degraded. On a tactical level this was good use of intelligence for counter-terrorism, but on a strategic level the military intelligence operation contributed to the defeat of France in Algeria.
The US military learnt from its failures in Iraq that led to the catastrophic civil war and the barbaric terrorism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of ‘Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers’. Under the leadership of General David Petraeus, in 2006 the US forces implemented the ‘Awakening’ campaign with Sunni tribes in Anbar Province and paid $300 a month to individuals to join the ‘Sons of Iraq’ militia to fight Al Qaeda and also ‘surged’ more troops into the country. The strategy reflected an intelligent understanding of tribal structures in Iraq, of divisions between local Sunni tribes and foreign Al Qaeda fighters, and of the local individuals necessary to execute such a strategy. This is strategic intelligence applied to counter-terrorism strategy with impressive results: Enemy initiated attacks against the US and its partners declined from a peak of around 1,800 per week in June 2007 to less than 400 per week by the end of 2008. The US military also continued with intelligence led targeted attacks (often drone strikes), killing at least twenty of Al Qaeda’s top thirty leaders from 2009 to 2013. Al Qaeda still exists, but is a shadow of what it was in 2003.
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All wars have differing circumstances. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government believes itself to be in a war with Hamas that it must win in order to ensure survival of the state of Israel. Given that Hamas is committed to not only destroying Israel but also killing Jews anywhere, the Israeli elemental fight for survival is understandable. How Israel fights Hamas to defeat terrorism is a question yet to be clearly answered. The lesson from the US is that an intelligence led approach taking years to destroy the leadership of Al Qaeda can work, but patience is required. The lesson from France in Algeria is that a tactical intelligence led approach can also work to destroy a local terrorist organisation, but the war can still be lost. Defeating terrorism is endless, but destroying the Hamas capability to conduct terrorist attacks by killing their leaders can succeed with a patient intelligence led approach.