No Pax Sinica for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
The Asian Crime Century briefing 94
Recent terrorist attacks that have caused the death of Chinese nationals working in Pakistan raised major security concerns ahead of the meeting of the Council of the Head of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation that took place in Islamabad on 15 and 16 October. The continued volume and intensity of attacks by militants on Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan has shown that the Pakistan government cannot provide a secure environment for Chinese investments and infrastructure projects.
The terrorist attacks and general lawlessness in Pakistan are a thorn in the development of a stable China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is critical for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as it is a means of shortening the route for energy imports and manufactured goods exports with a land corridor from China to the Middle East.
There are also strategic risks that make CPEC a single point of failure as a supply line for the PRC economy. Firstly, the border region includes disputed boundaries with Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the PRC that are a long term point of conflict between these states. Secondly, the geography of the border region between Pakistan and the PRC is highly challenging for infrastructure development, maintenance and protection. Thirdly, the transportation links pass through unstable areas of Pakistan that are subject to frequent terrorist attacks and general lawlessness.
According to PRC officials, CPEC is intended to contribute to security by improving economic development in Xinjiang that “has transformed from a region once threatened by extremism, terrorism and ethnic separatist activities to one currently undergoing multifaceted development, including in agriculture and tourism.” Whilst the PRC government can control the security environment in Xinjiang, and has done so in the past five years by means of pervasive suppression of the Uighur population, it must rely upon the government security forces in Pakistan to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals working in the country.
According to the CPEC Long Term Plan, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor “covers China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the whole territory of Pakistan.” The corridor passes through node cities that include in the PRC Kashgar, Atushi, Tumshuq, Shule, Shufu, Akto, Tashkurgan Tajik, and in Pakistan Gilgit, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, Quetta, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi and Gwadar. There have been terrorist attacks in all of these node cities in Pakistan recent years. Given the history of terrorist attacks as well as general level of crime in Pakistan, it is highly questionable if effective security and safety for Chinese nationals can be ensured.
Never ending terrorism
The prolonged history of terrorist attacks in Pakistan has increased in the past several years, and often involves targeting Chinese nationals and infrastructure projects. On 6 October, two Chinese staff of the Port Qasim Electric Power Company were killed and a third injured after their convoy was attacked with an improvised explosive device near Karachi airport. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which seems to have involved large quantities of explosives as 15 vehicles were reportedly destroyed. There are reports in news media in Pakistan that government the Counter-Terrorism Department has stated that the suicide bombing targeted Chinese engineers as part of efforts to damage Pakistan-China relations.
On 10 October, attackers armed with grenades and rocket launchers killed 20 and injured another 7 Pashtun workers at a coal mine in Balochistan province. The BLA has not yet claimed responsibility but is suspected to have conducted the attack, which was clearly at scale as around 40 men have been reported as being involved.
In August, BLA terrorists stopped vehicles on the highway from Punjab province, conducted identity checks and killed over 20 people they identified as from Punjab. On the same day, BLA terrorists also attacked police stations and military posts across Balochistan province and warned the public to stay away from highways as they would continue to fight against Pakistan security forces. The violence was clearly coordinated, with explosions and grenade attacks reported in the towns of Sibi, Panjgur, Mastung, Turbat, Bela, and Quetta, as well as a blast on a railway track near Mastung.
In March, five Chinese nationals and a Pakistani driver were killed in a suicide attack when a vehicle with explosives rammed their convoy near Besham city in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, located in northwest Pakistan. The Chinese victims were working on construction of a hydroelectric dam being constructed by a Chinese company.
In Gilgit in December 2023, eight people were killed and 26 others injured when terrorists opened fire on a passenger bus that was travelling from Gilgit to Rawalpindi on a highway that was built in 1986 with Chinese support and is a critical part of the CPEC. Moving further south to Peshawar, in January 2023 during Friday prayers at a mosque a suicide bomber killed over 100 people; recently a Pakistani police officer arrested in connection with planning the attack has been linked to terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
Neighbouring Karachi, also a strategic point for CPEC, is also vulnerable. In November 2018, three BLA terrorists carried out an attack on the PRC Consulate in Karachi and killed two police officers. The attackers tried to storm through the gates of the Consulate, leading to a firefight with Pakistani police and Rangers. The BLA issued a statement after the attack to say that “The objective of this attack is clear: we will not tolerate any Chinese military expansionist endeavours on Baloch soil.”
Security on the Single Point of Failure
CPEC passes through Balochistan province and terminates (or begins) at the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. Gwadar is a critical trade node for the PRC through which it can import oil from the Middle East and export goods manufactured in China. However, Balochistan province has a long running separatist insurgency that continues to ferment violence and instability across Pakistan.
When Pakistan was created in 1947, the Khan of Kalat controlled Balochistan but initially declared independence until being forced in 1948 to join Pakistan. The deployment of Pakistan military to occupy Balochistan led to the first uprising in 1948, followed by others from 1958 to 1959, 1963 to 1967, and 1972 to 1977. Baloch tribes are spread across Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan, separated by national borders that were largely drawn by the colonial British authorities. Afghanistan has been a base for Baloch resistance, with tribal support across the borders to resist the harsh military campaign conducted by the Pakistan army.
The CPEC, and especially the development of the port of Gwadar in Balochistan, has become a focal point for Baloch resistance and led to targeting of Chinese nationals and PRC business interests. There is a target rich environment not only in Balochistan but along the extensive CPEC transportation routes.
The heart of the insurgency and terrorist attacks are in Balochistan province, the southern point of CPEC. In response to the long term insurgency and terrorist attacks in Balochistan, the Pakistan government has deployed the full force of the state but has not defeated the BLA. According to a report in a media outlet from India, there are three infantry divisions each with at least 10,000 troops tasked with protection of Chinese personnel working on CPEC projects. In addition, the Pakistan military has at least two infantry brigades (around 5,500 troops each) at Turbat and Gwadar in the south of Balochistan and an armoured brigade at Khuzdar in the east of the province.
It is clear that the Pakistan military cannot defeat the BLA with its current approach, despite having large numbers of troops available for deployment. This raises the question of whether the PRC would strengthen the Pakistan military with an alternative approach to national security. In April, Ambassador Jiang Zaidong of the PRC Embassy in Pakistan said in a statement titled Implement A Holistic Approach to National Security, Write a Security Chapter in Building the China-Pakistan Community with a Shared Future that “China stands ready to further strengthen counter-terrorism and security cooperation with Pakistan, to maintain high pressure and rigorous operation, so as to decisively strike the rampant terrorism, effectively safeguard the lives and interests of our two peoples and jointly maintain regional peace and security as well as international fairness and justice.”
Further security cooperation between Pakistan and the PRC is developing, and the issue was highlighted in a meeting between Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan and Premier Li Qiang of the PRC that took place on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting. The leaders reiterated their commitment to upgrading CPEC, including construction of the ML-1 rail line from Karachi to Peshawar, the enhancement of the Karakoram Highway, and the development of infrastructure for Gwadar port to attract more cargo shipments. The PRC leader stated support for Chinese companies to invest in special economic zones in Pakistan, and to cooperate in the mining and minerals industries. The Pakistan and PRC governments “reiterated their commitment to combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations with a zero-tolerance attitude, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, and jointly oppose the politicization and instrumentalization of counterterrorism.”
What form security cooperation will take has yet to be seen. There are reports that the Pakistan and PRC governments have signed MOUs relating to security, including the provision of Chinese vehicles, and are discussing the establishment of a joint security company in Pakistan. As all security companies in the PRC are effectively controlled by the state, any security personnel deployment in Pakistan is likely to involve paramilitary officers.
According to the Carnegie Endowment, there was a significant expansion in the mid-2000s of Chinese private security contractors (PSC) operating outside of the country and by 2018 over 8,200 Chinese PSCs were registered, employing almost 5 million people, with more than thirty of these companies were operating outside of China’s borders, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Given the extent of Chinese investment in Pakistan and the impact of the Baloch terrorist attacks, it is likely that the PRC government is seeking direct control over security for Chinese personnel and key assets. This will be an embarrassment for the Pakistan government, which has been unable to defeat the BLA, protect its own citizens, or to safeguard Chinese workers.
The deployment of Chinese security officers, who will almost certainly be state paramilitary personnel from either the Public Security Bureau, the People’s Armed Police, or the People’s Liberation Army, cannot establish a Pax Sinica in Pakistan. Given the duration, intensity, and success of the Baloch insurgents, their defeat is highly unlikely. Chinese security officers may be able to provide an inner cordon around Chinese convoys and at Chinese operated facilities, but they cannot pacify the wider environment. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor seems likely to continue to provide a target rich environment for terrorist attacks, and CPEC will remain a single point of failure vulnerable to attack and disruption.