The Mumbai 26/11 attack and the long pursuit of terrorists
The Asian Crime Century briefing 114
Tahawwur Hussain Rana, alleged to be one of the planners of the terrorist attack in Mumbai that started on 26 November 2008, was extradited to India from the USA in April. Rana faces ten charges of conspiracy, murder, commission of a terrorist act, and forgery, related to his alleged involvement in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks committed by Pakistan backed Laskhar-e-Tayyiba between 26 to 29 November 2008. The successful extradition marks another step in the long process of authorities in India as well as their partners in other countries to bring those involved in the Mumbai terrorist attack to justice.
In January 2013, Rana, now aged 64, was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment after being found guilty in the US of charges relating to conspiring to provide material support to Laskhar-e-Tayyiba and to a foiled Laskhar-e-Tayyiba sponsored terrorist plot in Copenhagen, Denmark. Also in January 2013, and as part of the same proceedings, David Coleman Headley, a US citizen partly of Pakistani descent, was sentenced to 35 years in prison for crimes relating to his role in planning the Mumbai terrorist attacks as well as a proposed attack on a newspaper in Denmark.
The authorities in India have alleged that Rana facilitated fraudulent documents for Headley and also US citizen Daood Gilani to travel to Mumbai to carry out surveillance of potential sites for the attack. Headley allegedly received training from Laskhar-e-Tayyiba in Pakistan and was in communication with the group regarding plans for the Mumbai attack. Rana is alleged to have planned to open a branch of his immigration business in Mumbai and appoint Headley as the office manager. During their planning, Rana and Headley repeatedly met in Chicago to discuss the surveillance as well as Laskhar-e-Tayyiba plans for attacks in Mumbai.
After the November 2008 attacks, Rana told Headley that the Indians “deserved it” and that the nine Laskhar-e-Tayyiba terrorists should be awarded the ‘Nishan-e-Haider’, which is Pakistan’s highest award for gallantry in battle and reserved for fallen soldiers. The request to extradite Rana from the US to India was made in 2020, but has been contested for the past five years right up to the Supreme Court, which denied his application for a stay of extradition. Rana’s extradition to India comes over 20 years after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack and marks a moment to reflect on the attack, the despicable Laskhar-e-Tayyiba disregard for the victims, and some of the heroism shown during the attack.
Mumbai, November 2008
In 2008 the author was Director of Security for McKinsey and Company, which involved managing terrorist risk for offices and consulting teams around the world during what were the ‘Al Qaeda years’ of heightened terrorist risk. On 12 November 2008, the author organised a meeting in Mumbai of chief security officers (CSOs) from major international and CSOs of several of the largest corporations in India. One of the speakers to the closed door event was recently retired Lt. Gen. Deepak Summanwar, a former Director General of Military Intelligence, who spoke about the threat of ‘Terrorism in India’ and confidently stated that the origin and driver of the threat was “Pakistan, Pakistan, Pakistan”. Only two weeks before the 26/11 attack in Mumbai, it was clear that there was a high threat level from Pakistan backed terrorism.
Terrorist threat levels were at high levels around the world in 2008, including in India. According to the US National Counterterrorism Centre, throughout 2008 there were a total of approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks around the world. Most of these terrorist incidents were in Iraq (5,016), which was at that time in the midst of civil war and insurgency against US occupation. The countries with the next highest number of attacks were Pakistan (2,293), Afghanistan (1,989), and then India (1,113). The ongoing global conflict with Al Qaeda and related groups was affecting India and leading to heightened terrorist risk in the country.
The terrorist attack started on 26 November 2008 at around 2120 hours local time in Mumbai, conducted by four mobile attack teams of a total of ten terrorists who combined armed assaults, carjackings, drive by shootings, use of explosive devices, taking over buildings and hostage taking (Timeline from RAND, The Lessons from Mumbai, January 2009).
In the following 20 minutes there was gunfire outside of the Trident Oberoi Hotel at Nariman Point, outside the Leopold Café at Colaba in south Mumbai behind the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, and near the Bade Miyan Café behind the Taj Hotel in south Mumbai. Around the same time, terrorists entered Nariman House and took over the Chbad Lubavich Centre (a Jewish centre in the city) in Nariman House.
At 2145 hours terrorists entered the Taj Hotel and opened fire indiscriminately. Around the same time there was shooting at the Mumbai central train station, also nearby at the headquarters of the Mumbai municipal corporation, the Gokuldas Hospital, the Cama & Albless Hospital and at the Metro Theatre. From 2300 hours there were multiple explosions from small devices left by the terrorists.
The continual shooting continued in multiple locations, until at 0100 hours on 27 November there was a large explosion in the Taj Hotel which was caused by the detonation of several grenades and a fire soon broke out in the building.
It was not until 0915 hours on 27 November that Indian Army forces stormed the Trident Oberoi Hotel and also made their first attempt to take control of the Taj Hotel. During that morning, the security forces engaged in room by room clearance of the Taj Hotel. Meanwhile, other buildings remained under the control of the multiple terrorist attack teams.
At 0730 hours on 28 November, the National Security Guard (the primary counter terrorism unit in India), also known as the ‘Black Cats’, stormed Nariman House. Five of the Black Cat commandos abseiled from a helicopter onto the roof of Nariman House, leading to a prolonged gunfight with the terrorists in the building involving several dozen grenade explosions and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. By 1700 hours, the commandos believed that as none of the hostages in Nariman House remained alive they could mount an assault on the building, which they did by firing a rocket launder through a fifth floor window. The assault on Nariman House ended at 1745 hours, with the commandos reporting that no hostages or terrorists remained alive in the building.
The hostage siege in the Trident Oberoi Hotel ended at 1100 hours, after the two man terrorist team had killed 30 people in the building. A McKinsey director was staying in a room in the Trident Oberoi Hotel, and was in phone contact with the author as we discussed how he could stay safe during the attack. After hours of tense waiting, without the terrorists reaching the director’s room, we organised a team of Israeli security professionals who were former Sayeret Matkal (an Israeli Defence Forces elite reconnaissance unit) to enter the building to rescue him. The Israelis walked into the hotel (which illustrated the porous cordon around the hotel by the Indian forces), located the director, and walked out with the him to a waiting car to drive him to safety. Daring, brave, brilliant.
Fighting continued in the Taj Hotel. At 1300 hours, Indian forces reported finding 30 civilians dead in one hall in the Taj Hotel. A group of McKinsey employees were having dinner in a restaurant in the Taj Hotel, but were quick thinking enough to escape from the building through a window. Fighting in the Taj Palace huge hotel continued into the morning of 29 November, and the siege was only declared over at 0850 hours.
The ten terrorists were all from Pakistan. They came by sea on a fishing trawler that sailed from Karachi. Around 22 November, the terrorists had hijacked an Indian fishing boat at sea, killed all of the crew except the captain, and sailed into Mumbai. The captain was beheaded by the terrorists as his boat approached Mumbai.
The terrorists were heavily armed, each carrying an AK-56 automatic assault rifle (a Chinese version of the Russian AK-47) with seven magazines of ammunition (30 rounds each), 9-mm pistols with two clips of ammunition, and 8 to 10 hand grenades each as well as a number of improvised explosive devices.
The 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack resulted in the death of 172 people in fighting that went on for 60 hours and brought Mumbai to a standstill. Only one of the terrorists survived the attack, and interrogation revealed that the attacks were organised by Laskhar-e-Tayyiba.
After November in Mumbai
In May 2009, the author organised another meeting of corporate security leaders in Mumbai, held at the Trident Oberoi Hotel which had been a target of the 26/11 terrorist attack. One of the speakers at the event was the General Manager of the Trident Hotel, who talked about his experiences during the first night of the attack. He and his staff were trained and ready for a terrorist incident, as were all hotels in major cities in India because of the long running threat from mainly Islamist terrorist groups based in or allied to Pakistan. He recounted how he had started to evacuate guests, guide them to safety, and helped the many terrified people in the hotel, all whilst gunfire erupted around him. After around an hour he realised that he had been focussed on helping others, but his wife and children were waiting for him in their apartment in the hotel. He rushed to their suite and guided them out of the hotel to safety.
The security conference in the Trident Oberoi Hotel in May 2009 was far larger than the private meeting of chief security officers held earlier in November 2008 before the attacks. Every corporate security manager with responsibility for India wanted to attend. Lt. Gen. Deepak Summanwar also joined us, and was greeted by many of his former Indian Army officers who had served with him in the Kargill War with Pakistan from May to July 1999. The Kargill fighting was at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres and with temperatures dropping down to well below freezing Lt. Gen. Summanwar had motivated his troops by handing out and eating raw hot chillies, which his subordinates recalled with fond memories (if not relish).
Tahawwur Hussain Rana has been extradited from the US and is now in the custody of the authorities in India, being questioned about his knowledge of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. The Indian National Investigation Agency is reportedly assessing not only the role of Pakistan based Laskhar-e-Tayyiba leaders in the planning and execution of the attack, but also of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officers. David Headley is suspected to have links not only to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba but also to the ISI, which is the leading Pakistan intelligence agency operated jointly by the military. As Lt. Gen. Summanwar explained to us at our meeting on 12 November 2008, before the Mumbai terrorist attack, the driver of terrorism in the region is “Pakistan, Pakistan, Pakistan.” More than 20 years after the 26/11 terrorist attack, there is more work to be done to bring those responsible to justice.