There have been a flurry of espionage cases leading to arrests in the past several years that highlight how spying by China on the US and its allies has been intensifying. Those involved in the cases have been academics (thinkers), sailors, soldiers, and intelligence officers.
The US and its allies are dealing with a surge in espionage by the PRC that is challenging for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to counter. The PRC uses its multiple intelligence and united front agencies for economic espionage as well as targeting other states (for military or political espionage). They particularly make use of overseas scientists to bring knowledge to the PRC, which according to the FBI often involves stealing proprietary information or violating export controls and conflict-of-interest rules. This has involved state espionage efforts such as the “Thousand Talents Program” that was created in 2008 to overcome a massive brain drain as the majority of Chinese scholars studying overseas did not return to the PRC after completing their studies. The broad PRC strategy also involves ‘united front’ work that not only involves the spread of influence but is also an espionage tool for PRC government agencies.
Thinker
In June, Professor Xi Xiaoxing of Temple University in the US was granted leave by an appeals court to pursue a claim of negligent prosecution against the US Department of Justice. Professor Xi was charged in 2015 with four counts of wire fraud in an alleged scheme involving the exploitation of technology for the benefit of third parties in the PRC. He was born in the PRC but is a naturalised US citizen and a world-renowned expert in the field of magnesium diboride thin film superconducting technology. Professor Xi was alleged to have sought to assist PRC entities in becoming world leaders of the superconductivity field. The prosecution case against Professor Xi collapsed after it was shown that he had not provided secret technical information to a university in Shanghai but had instead provided other non-classified information.
The arrest of Professor Xi was part of a structured effort by the US authorities to counter technology theft by the PRC, which has allegedly been conducted using espionage to recruit Chinese academics in the US. The circumstances have had the effect of unfairly targeting Chinese and other Asians. In February 2022, the US Justice Department stated that it was ceasing the ‘China Initiative’ program that was started during the tenure of President Donald Trump in 2018 to counter PRC theft of US intellectual property.
Despite closing this program, Director Christopher Wray said in February 2022 that the FBI has more than 2,000 PRC-related cases dealing with the PRC attempting to steal US information or technology and opens a new China-related case every 12 hours. The espionage threat from the PRC is real, but the case against Professor Xi was the wrong one. Far more effective are those cases that identify and involve professional PRC intelligence officers or operatives recruiting agents to spy.
Sailor
Last week two US Navy sailors appeared in federal court in Southern California charged with espionage. The sailors, Jinchao Wei and Wenheng Zhao, each pleaded not guilty. 22 year old Wei is a machinist’s mate assigned to the amphibious vessel USS Essex, and was arrested on 3 August in San Diego. Prosecutors have stated that Wei told a colleague that he was recruited by the PRC for what was "quite obviously fucking espionage."
Wei is alleged to have provided information regarding US Navy ships to a PRC intelligence officer. Wei was handled by the Chinese intelligence officer who according to the indictment provided intelligence collection priorities to Wei who communicated the information to his handler using Internet based encryption. Wei provided a variety of documents relating to the USS Essex as well as other amphibious assault ships for which he was paid by his PRC intelligence officer handler, with transfers of only up to $15,000.
26 year old Zhao is a Petty Officer First Class serving as a construction electrician at the Ventura County naval base in California, and was arrested on 2 August to be charged with receiving bribes from a PRC intelligence officer in exchange for sensitive information. According to the indictment, Zhao was recruited by the Chinese intelligence officer in August 2021 and spied until at least May 2023. He communicated sensitive information to his handler using Internet based encryption and was paid for his spying. In August 2021, Zhao was tasked by his handler to find information regarding a large scale military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region and he subsequently took a photograph of a large scale exercise diagram that he sent to the PRC intelligence officer. Zhao took pictures of other exercises as well as sensitive systems in use on US Navy vessels. Zhao received payments amounting to $14,886.76.
Both sailors received a rather paltry sum as agents to betray their country.
Soldier
At the end of July, a Taiwan Army lieutenant colonel serving in the Aviation and Special Forces Command unit responsible for defending Taipei City was arrested on suspicion of providing military intelligence for the PRC and of building a spy network from retired and serving army officers. The lieutenant colonel, surname Hsieh (謝), served in the 601st brigade based in Longtan District, Taoyuan City, assigned to defend the Taipei area and northern Taiwan. Four retired Taiwan army officers are also being investigated by the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. Also arrested and detained was a “middleman” who had passed on intelligence gathered by lieutenant colonel Hsieh to the PRC government.
Taiwan prosecutors have stated that previous espionage cases which usually involved retired military officers recruited whilst overseas and given gifts, whilst the latest case differs as the PRC intelligence services are reaching into Taiwan and targeting active duty military personnel. A report earlier this year suggested that up to 90% of retired Taiwanese military officers spent time in the PRC where they provided information to the PRC government in return for money. The differing Chinese espionage approach may suggest that the PRC intelligence agencies are more actively searching for information regarding Taiwanese missile installations and defensive capabilities. The assessment of such high PRC recruitment of retired Taiwanese military officers as well as the access to current Taiwanese military defence capabilities suggests some fundamental weaknesses in Taiwan that need to be urgently addressed by the government and the military.
Spy
In October 2022, four PRC nationals, including three Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence officers, were charged in connection with a long-running intelligence campaign targeting individuals in the US to act as agents of the PRC. The US Department of Justice stated that MSS intelligence officers and others used a purported academic institute at Ocean University of China, referred to as the Institute for International Studies (IIS), as cover for their intelligence activities. The MSS officers then used this cover operating under the guise of academics at the IIS to target professors at US universities and others in the US with access to sensitive information and equipment.
In a separate case, a federal court in New York charged two PRC intelligence officers, who were not arrested and are wanted, with attempting to obstruct a criminal prosecution in the Eastern District of New York. The US Department of Justice stated that the PRC intelligence officers were conducting intelligence operations targeting the US, and from 2019 they directed an employee at a U. government law enforcement agency, whom they believed they had recruited as an asset, to steal confidential information about a criminal case in order to interfere with the prosecution. The agent they recruited was in fact working as a double agent on behalf of the FBI.
Both cases illustrate the extent of major operational activity in the US by professional PRC intelligence operatives.
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Espionage is crime, and this is reflected by the agencies such as the FBI that pursue spies who engage in this activity. The most effective means to counter the impact of economic espionage is criminal prosecutions, as this will impact those who seek to steal secrets to provide to foreign powers even if their professional intelligence officer handlers are not arrested (as is usually the case).
There is without doubt a surge in PRC espionage activity that is being better understood and reported in many Western countries. The primary target is of course the US, but allies such as Australia, Japan, and the UK are also targets. Taiwan is of course a long term espionage target of the PRC as part of efforts to defeat the Kuomintang and gain control over the island. Agencies in these countries need to increase their effectiveness against PRC espionage, and treat collaboration with PRC intelligence officers as a crime. There will be many more cases of thinker, sailor, soldier, spy.
There is no smoke without fire. As it is smokier, there must be more fire. Increased espionage in stealing tech secrets could be read as simply trying to get tech on the cheap. But it may reflect a real gap in abilities. It is interesting to know if Japanese espionage in the PRC and counter espionage is effective.